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1In this report, the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, and The Corporate Library (TCL) examine
mutual fund proxy voting on executive compensation issues. Our purpose is to deter-
mine the extent to which mutual funds have exercised their responsibility to vote in
their shareholders’ best interests on measures that would reasonably restrain executive
compensation and link CEO pay more closely to company performance. Recent media
coverage has increased public understanding about the outrageously high pay packages
afforded to company executives, independent of their performance. To date, however,
little attention has been paid to the worst enablers of this trend—the largest institu-
tional investors, who possess a unique opportunity to exert influence over a board’s
executive pay decisions through their formidable voting power.
In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began requiring mutual
funds to disclose their proxy votes for the first time. The new rule enables the public to
clearly discern for the first time exactly who is—and who is not—supporting pay prac-
tices that unjustly enrich company executives at the expense of shareholders. This
report relies upon N-PX filings that companies use to report proxy votes to the SEC. On
the following pages we analyze the voting records of 18 of the largest mutual fund
families on executive compensation-related proposals at corporate annual meetings
from July 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005. Our findings indicate that, with a few exceptions,
the largest mutual fund families are complicit in runaway executive compensation for
failing to vote in the best interests of the shareholders.
We have created a proxy voting profile on compensation issues for each of the
fund families evaluated. Our analysis ranks the voting practices of these funds from
best to worst. We have used the data collected to identify the four fund families that
have been most critical of lavish executive pay practices, as well as the five fund 
families that most consistently failed to use their voting power to challenge current
practices. We dubbed the fund families in this latter category the “pay enablers” for
perpetuating an unconditional spoils system for wealthy CEOs.
 
2About the Authors
AFSCME
AFSCME is the largest union in the AFL-CIO, representing 1.4 million state and local
government, health care and child care workers. AFSCME members have their retirement
assets invested by public pension systems with combined assets totaling more than $1 trillion
dollars. Confidence in the markets, transparency and appropriate regulations are the 
foundation of AFSCME’s investment success. Gerald W. McEntee, president of AFSCME, chairs
the AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, which as an institutional investor and active owner,
engages public companies on shareholder issues such as executive compensation and board
accountability.
The Corporate Library
The Corporate Library (TCL) is an independent research firm with well-known products
such as the Board Analyst Database and the Director Interocks Tool. It compiles data, research-
es and engages in critical thinking about the nature of the modern global corporation, with a
special emphasis on best practices and standards. Its Board Analyst product rates boards of
directors on an A-F scale, allowing investors and analysts to evaluate governance as an element
of investment risk. TCL also publishes special reports and studies, including reports on CEO
employment contracts, related transactions, mutual fund proxy votes, board interlocks, and
CEO and director compensation. TCL has an extensive database of over 2,000 public compa-
nies, covering over 20,000 directors in considerable detail, including their non-corporate and
private enterprise affiliations. It also provides general information on the full U.S. director and
officer universe of over 130,000 individuals via its IPO Compliance Tool. TCL provides data and
analysis to search firms, D&O liability insurers, law firms, accounting firms, press, institutional
and individual investors, academic institutions and corporations.
3The Role of Shareholders
The annual compensation for CEOs is growing at an unprecedented rate, despite corpo-
rate governance reforms passed in the wake of scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and
Adelphia. Today, the average CEO earns $11.8 million annually in salary, bonuses and long-term
equity-based incentives.1 In 2004, the last year for which detailed disclosures are available, pay
for CEOs at more than 1,500 large U.S. public companies accelerated at double the rate of the
previous year, meaning they received 14.5 percent raises in 2004 after having received raises
averaging 7.2 percent the year before.2 In 2002, CEOs received raises of 10 percent. Meanwhile,
worker pay has remained virtually stagnant. In 2004, total compensation for the average non-
supervisory company worker rose by a meager 2.2 percent to $27,485 annually, according to an
April 2005 study.3
In theory, corporate boards and compensation committees are vested with the responsi-
bility to ensure that executive pay is tied to creating value for companies and their sharehold-
ers. In practice, however, this oversight function often is carried out with insufficient vigor,
allowing pay to be decoupled from performance and pushing absolute pay levels into the strato-
sphere. A number of factors—including CEO influence over director nominations, inadequate
consideration of often-complex compensation issues and social influences such as a group bias
toward collegiality— undermine boards’ ability and willingness to bargain at arm’s length over
executive compensation. The executive labor market and the market for corporate control con-
strain executive pay only in extreme cases.4
As a result, it falls upon shareholders to use the mechanisms available to them to stem
excessive compensation and link pay more closely to corporate performance. Shareholders
overwhelmingly believe that such reform is appropriate and necessary. In an April 2005 survey,
75 percent of major institutional investors stated their belief that CEO salaries at major U.S.
companies are excessive.5 A December 2005 study found the figure to be even higher, with 90
percent of institutional investors saying the current system overpays executives.6
Shareholders have a strong financial motivation for constraining executive compensa-
tion. Compensation to the five highest-paid CEOs of public companies accounted for 9.8 percent
of their aggregate earnings in the period from 2001 to 2003, up from just 5 percent of aggregate
earnings from 1993 to 1995, according to a 2005 study.7 The study concluded that these pay
increases could not be accounted for by company performance or the growth in overall market
capitalization. Additionally, shareholders have an interest in encouraging compensation
arrangements that offer incentives to executives who refrain from self-dealing and make deci-
sions that maximize the company’s value. Poorly designed compensation schemes fail at these
tasks and thus impose indirect costs on shareholders.8
1. Sarah Anderson, John Cavanaugh, Scott Klinger, and Liz Stanton, “Executive Excess 2005: 12th Annual CEO Compensation
Survey,” Institute for Policy Studies/United for a Fair Economy, August 30, 2005, p. 3.
2. “The Corporate Library’s CEO Pay Survey 2004,” October 2005.
3. Corporate Watch (available on www.aflcio.org).
4. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, “Pay Without Performance,” 2004, p. 53-58  (hereinafter, “Pay Without Performance”)
5. “Major Investors Critical of CEO Pay Disclosure,” Pearl Meyer & Partners, April 29, 2005. Eighty-eight institutional investors
with median assets of $36 billion were surveyed.
6. “Institutional Investors Dissatisfied with U.S. Executive Pay System, Watson Wyatt Study Find,” Watson Wyatt, Dec.13, 2005.
Fifty-five institutions managing $800 billion in assets were surveyed. 
7. Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein, “The Growth in Executive Pay,” 21 Oxford Rev. Econ. Policy 283, 2005.
8. See: “Pay Without Performance,” supra note 4, at 19.
4Shareholders have two main avenues of influence over executive compensation. The first
is litigation under state-law theories on waste or breach of fiduciary duty. This avenue has
proved to be nearly useless because the legal bar to prove such claims is set extremely high.
Courts apply the “business judgment rule” and defer to board decisions in all but the most
egregious cases. Procedural obstacles such as the “demand” requirement for a shareholder
derivative claim also lower the likelihood of success.
The second mechanism shareholders can use is their voting power. Shareholders have
the opportunity to vote on certain kinds of compensation plans, which are put forward for
shareholder approval by a company’s board. Shareholder-sponsored proxy proposals can seek
to reform compensation policies or practices in some way. Academic studies support the notion
that shareholder voting can be effective in curbing executive compensation. One study of share-
holder proposals conducted in the mid-1990s found that executive pay at firms where share-
holder proposals on executive compensation had been approved declined by an average of $2.7
million during the two-year period after the proposal was passed, despite the fact that such pro-
posals are not binding on the company.9 Another study found that higher levels of “against”
votes on management compensation proposals were followed by lower rates of increase in CEO
pay.10
Anecdotal evidence also bolsters the case that shareholder voting can play a key role in
reforming executive compensation practices. In the 1990s, the benefit of outside director pen-
sions, once commonplace, nearly disappeared once shareholders drew widespread attention to
the practice and made a case that such employment-like benefits inappropriately incentivized
outside directors to avoid challenging management. More recently, shareholder proposals ask-
ing companies to recognize the cost of employee stock options on their income statements led
hundreds of companies to do so in advance of any requirement by financial accounting stan-
dards-setters. These proposals also signaled to regulators that investors favored a blanket
expensing requirement.
Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting
Mutual funds have a key role to play in restraining CEO overcompensation because of
their status as large shareholders with proxy voting fiduciary responsibility. According to the
most recent statistics, more than $8.1 trillion is invested in mutual funds, including $4.38 trillion
in equity funds and $519 billion in hybrid funds.11 All told, mutual funds hold about 24 percent
of all U.S. companies.12 As a result, mutual funds wield enormous control over the conduct of
the boards of American businesses. Moreover, a precious few investment firms possess dispro-
portionately large power within the industry, because mutual fund assets are highly concentrat-
ed, with the 10 largest fund families managing 51 percent of all fund assets.13 Mutual funds are
an important vehicle for collectivizing the investments of millions of individuals who use mutu-
al funds to save for their retirement or their children’s college educations. Nearly half of all U.S.
9. Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, “The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation,” March 12,
1999 (available on www.ssrn.com).
10. Kenneth J. Martin and Randall S. Thomas, “When is Enough, Enough?  Market Reaction to Highly Dilutive Stock Option
Plans and the Subsequent Impact on CEO Compensation,” February 2003 (available on www.ssrn.com).
11. Investment Company’s Insitute’s 2005 Investment Company Fact Book, 45th Edition, 2005 at 122.
12. Ibid at 6.
13. Ibid at 8.
5households invest in mutual funds, which account, on average, for 20 percent of their financial
assets.14
The legal regime governing mutual funds requires that mutual funds be managed in the
interests of their shareholders.15 Until the recent SEC rule change, however, there was no dis-
closure requirement on mutual funds’ proxy votes, making it impossible for mutual fund share-
holders to judge whether votes were in their best interests. In 2002, in response to urging from
investor advocates including the AFL-CIO, the Council of Institutional Investors and The
Corporate Library’s Bob Monks and Nell Minow, the SEC proposed a requirement mandating
that mutual funds disclose both their proxy voting policies and the actual votes cast at portfolio
companies. In doing so, the SEC emphasized the importance of mutual funds to effective share-
holder oversight: “As major shareholders, mutual funds may play a vital role in monitoring the
stewardship of the companies in which they invest.”16 Despite strong opposition from the
mutual fund industry, the SEC approved the rule in 2003 and set August 31, 2004, as the dead-
line for disclosure of votes cast in the year ended June 30, 2004.
Given the size of mutual funds’ holdings, reform of executive compensation is unlikely to
be successful without the industry’s support. In the absence of market-correcting mechanisms,
such as increased scrutiny of executive compensation by large investors, “the result will be
imposition of regulatory controls,” stated Delaware Chancery Court Judge William Chandler,
whose court regulates corporate behavior. “The entire matter of executive compensation, which
seems in some cases to have come spectacularly unhinged from the market for corporate talent,
will either be regulated by you the fiduciaries, or by the politicians.”17
Findings
This study examines a wide range of votes from large mutual fund families, including
both management proposals on executive pay issues and shareholder-sponsored compensation
proposals, which appeared on proxy ballots for the 2005 annual general meetings. Using N-PX
filings with the SEC on which mutual funds disclose their votes, this report analyzes the proxy
voting records of 18 of the largest 25 mutual fund families for which we were able to parse their
election data sets. We examined all executive compensation-related proposals at corporate
annual meetings from July 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005. This report’s purpose is to determine the
extent to which mutual funds have voted to limit executive compensation or to tie it more close-
ly to company performance.
The report shows that mutual funds in general are enabling executive compensation
excesses. With a few exceptions, the largest mutual fund families are complicit in runaway exec-
utive compensation because they have not used their voting power in ways that would constrain
pay by tying it more closely to individual company performance. In the aggregate, the mutual
funds voted to support management recommendations on compensation issues—both recom-
mendations to vote in favor of management compensation proposals and recommendations to
vote against shareholder proposals seeking executive pay reform—73.9 percent of the time and
rejected the management position only 23.7 percent of the time.
14. Ibid at 4.
15. Investment Company Act of 1940.
16. Release No. 33-8188, “Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies,” Sept. 23, 2003 (hereinafter, “2003 Release”).
17. William B. Chandler, “When Boards Make (or Allow) Bad Decisions—Anatomy of a Board Liability Case,” 2005 NACD
Annual Corporate Governance Conference, Oct. 25, 2005.
6As a voting block, these 18 mutual fund families had the following voting patterns:
• The average vote in favor of management proposals on compensation issues 
was 75.6 percent.
• The average vote in favor of compensation-related shareholder proposals was 
27.6 percent.
• Shareholder proposals to expense stock options and proposals to cap severance
agreements were the only proposals supported by a majority of mutual fund 
voters; these proposals averaged 74.8 and 62.2 percent support, respectively. 
• Shareholder proposals on performance-based equity compensation were 
supported by mutual funds an average of 37.6 percent of the time.
• For most fund families, company-specific compensation practice—as rated by 
The Corporate Library—had no impact on the whether mutual funds voted to 
approve or reject management’s compensation proposals. Shareholders, 
however, were most likely to file their pay resolutions at companies that 
received an F rating for compensation.18
Overall Fund Rankings
In order to develop a comprehensive picture of how each fund family dealt with pay
issues compared to their peers, we created a composite ranking by averaging each fund family’s
rankings on their voting in three categories: management recommendations, management pro-
posals and shareholder proposals. Based upon the average from these three metrics, we ranked
the fund families from 1 to 18, with “1” being the most sensitive to shareholder compensation
concerns and “18” being the greatest “pay enablers.” Five fund families are identified as pay
enablers because they consistently failed to use their proxy voting power in ways that would
limit excesses in executive pay schemes. Four mutual funds that scored significantly better than
their peers on executive compensation issues are identified as “pay constrainers.” 
Rank Fund Score
10 Fidelity Investments  9.7
11 American Funds 10.0
12T T. Rowe Price Group 11.3
12T Smith Barney Asset 
Management (Citigroup)
11.3
14 OppenheimerFunds 12.7
15 AllianceBernstein 13.0
16 Dreyfus Corporation 15.0
17 AIM Investments 15.7
18 Morgan Stanley Funds 17.0
Rank Fund Score
1 American Century
Investment Management
2.3
2 TIAA-CREF Asset Management 4.0
3 Federated Investors 5.3
4 Vanguard Group 6.0
5 Janus Capital Group 6.7
6 Legg Mason 7.3
7 Merrill Lynch Investment Managers 7.7
8T Franklin Templeton 8.0
8T Putnam Investments 8.0
18. For companies that receive an “A“rating from The Corporate Library for compensation, shareholder proposals made up 2.2
percent of all compensation-related proposals (number of proposals at A-rated companies: 178; management-sponsored pro-
posals: 174; shareholder-sponsored proposals: 4; percentage of shareholder proposals at A-rated companies: 4/178 = 2.2%).
For companies that received an “F” rating for compensation, shareholder proposals made up 45.8% of all compensation-relat-
ed proposals (number of proposals at F-rated companies: 212; management-sponsored proposals: 115; shareholder-sponsored
proposals: 97; percentage shareholder proposals: 97/212 = 45.8%).
7The Pay Enablers
Across all the proposal types for which we measured fund voting patterns, five funds
stood out for their uncritical view of manager proposals on pay and their lack of support for
shareholder efforts to constrain pay. In order to qualify as a pay enabler, the fund had to fall
into the bottom third of the average combined ranking in all three of the following categories:
• Opposition to management recommendations on all compensation-related proposals
• Votes for shareholder compensation proposals
• Votes against management proposals
In addition, each of the pay enablers voted below the average support level in each of
these separate categories.
Using this approach, we identified Morgan Stanley, AIM, Dreyfus, AllianceBernstein and
OppenheimerFunds as the worst pay enablers. Morgan Stanley ranked significantly below all of
its peers in our analysis and has the worst pay-enabling proxy voting record. It casts votes
against management’s recommendations only 8.1 percent of the time and supports management
pay proposals 94.7 percent of the time. While the Fidelity funds ranked in the middle of funds in
terms of their composite voting record, they were the least supportive of shareholder efforts to
control pay, voting for shareholder proposals only 2.2 percent of the time. Putnam ranked a
close second, supporting shareholder proposals only 2.6 percent of the time. Both of these fund
families, however, while not supporting shareholders, were among the most aggressive in voting
against management-sponsored compensation proposals. 
The Pay Constrainers
We identified American Century, TIAA-CREF, Federated and Vanguard as pay constrain-
ers. American Century and TIAA-CREF were the fund families whose voting patterns most con-
sistently challenged executive pay practices. TIAA-CREF was the most likely to support share-
holder efforts to control pay, supporting shareholder proposals 53.4 percent of the time. Janus
and American Century also supported shareholder proposals significantly more often than their
peers, supporting more than 40 percent of shareholder compensation proposals. 
Federated mutual funds voted most frequently against management’s recommendations,
doing so 53.4 percent of the time. The Federated funds opposed management compensation
proposals more than any other mutual fund family in the study, voting to reject management
proposals 61.2 percent of the time. American Century followed Federated in opposing manage-
ment’s recommendations 38.6 percent of the time and was third in rejecting management pro-
posals 36.7 percent of the time. Vanguard qualified as a pay constrainer for opposing manage-
ment’s recommendations and management proposals more than one third of the time.
Methodology
Data for this study was extracted from N-PX filings from 18 of the 25 largest fund fami-
lies for which we could disaggregate data. The study examined all votes cast on compensation-
related issues by each fund family for the period of July 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005, using parsing
8techniques designed by research staff at The Corporate Library.19 We examined votes for 2,393
management compensation proposals and 362 shareholder compensation proposals at 1,603
companies held in portfolios (accounting for 1,642 shareholder meetings). In total, 37,966 votes
were cast by the funds of the mutual fund families in this study. (See Appendix B for the voting
breakdown for each mutual fund family. Note: We do not break down the fund portfolios or indi-
vidual funds under each family.)
Funds’ votes were measured and comparison-ranked for the following proposal cate-
gories: management’s recommendations, management proposals, shareholder proposals, option
expensing, performance-based options and severance. (See Appendix A for the breakdown by
proposal category.) In addition, for each fund we compared how they cast votes on management
proposals at companies whose compensation practices were rated from “A” to “F” by The
Corporate Library.
For management-sponsored proposals to approve compensation plans, management
would recommend that shareholders vote “for” these proposals. This report considers an
“against” vote to be more likely to serve shareholder interests. We recognize that compensation
plans can be designed with features that tie pay more closely to performance and are thus con-
sidered “shareholder-friendly.” These design features, which require the use of indexed, premi-
um-priced and contingent-vesting stock options,20 as well as performance-vesting restricted
stock,21 are still rare, though, despite the fact that they reduce the cost to the company of
awarding a given number of options or shares.22
The vast majority of compensation plans give nearly unlimited discretion to the compen-
sation committee to decide what kinds of vehicles to use and whether to impose hurdles related
to company performance. As a result, standard at-the-money stock options and restricted stock
that vests with the passage of time continue to be the norm when compensation committees
implement equity-based compensation plans. These arrangements are clearly not in the inter-
ests of a company’s shareholders. 
Similar problems plague the administration of plans geared toward providing cash incen-
tive compensation, which shareholders may be asked to approve for tax-related reasons. Studies
show that companies are likely to pay cash bonuses to executives based on windfalls (like the
receipt of a litigation recovery unrelated to current business activities) or luck (like changes in
commodity prices or exchange rates), rewarding executives for events outside their control.23
The inclusion in income of projected (not actual) earnings on a company’s defined-benefit pen-
sion plan raises similar issues. Compensation committees may set modest performance targets
19. Compensation-related agenda items reported in these filings were identified and categorized using a variety of keyword
combinations in queries against the dataset (keyword examples include: incentive, option, pay, performance, compensation,
bonus, severance, executive, etc.). 
20. A standard stock option has an exercise price equal to the market price of the stock on the grant date. Thus, any appreci-
ation in stock price, even if driven by market- or industry-wide factors, will result in compensation to the option holder.
Indexed, premium-priced and contingent-vesting options tailor the payout more closely to the performance of the company
itself. 
21. Performance-vesting restricted stock does not vest—meaning, the restrictions on resale do not lapse—until some perform-
ance benchmark has been achieved. In some cases, the shares are forfeited if the goal is not achieved; other times, the stock
vests later if the target is not met.
22. Bebchuk and Fried, supra note 4, at 137-46, 172-73.
23. Olivier Jean Blanchard et al., “What Do Firms Do with Cash Windfalls?” J. Fin Econ. 36 (1994); Marianne Bertrand and
Sendhil Mullainathan, “Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are,” Q. Jl. Econ. 116, 2001.
9or may change the targets midstream when it becomes apparent that actual results will fall
short.24
Shareholder-sponsored proposals suggest some change to the company’s senior execu-
tive compensation policies, and management almost always recommends that shareholders vote
“against” them. Shareholders submit compensation-related proposals on a wide variety of sub-
jects, including improved disclosure, the use of particular equity instruments to compensate
executives, severance arrangements, the accounting treatment of stock options25 and pay dis-
parity within companies. Although poorly drafted or otherwise flawed shareholder proposals do
make it onto company proxy statements on occasion, we believe that the bulk of shareholder
proposals on executive compensation would tie pay more closely to company performance or
encourage additional disclosure on executive compensation. Accordingly, we view a “for” vote
on these proposals as being in the best interests of shareholders and more likely to constrain
excessive pay. 
Fund families that reported votes for each separate fund in their N-PX filings have mul-
tiple votes on specific proposals included in our data sets, which account for the large number
of votes recorded by some mutual fund families. For the most part, fund families voted consis-
tently across all funds. 
The analysis reviewed management proposals on the compensation issues of equity
plans, incentive plans and deferred compensation (basically, equity plans). It also reviewed
mutual fund votes on compensation-related shareholder proposals, which included CEO com-
pensation, compensation disclosure, option expensing, performance-based options, severance
agreements and pay disparity reporting.
24. Compensation committees can make changes to incentive plans that seem designed to ensure payouts. During Fiscal Year
2003, long-term incentive pay granted to Home Depot CEO Robert Nardelli and other named executives was payable based on
reaching certain Total Stockholder Return (TSR) thresholds in comparison with its peers. But for Fiscal Year 2004, as announced
in the proxy for the 2005 annual meeting, Home Depot changed the performance metric for executives’ long-term incentive
pay from TSR versus a peer group, to an Earnings Per Share measure. Home Depot has performed very well in regards to EPS
growth, but has performed badly for the TSR metric.
25. Although the Financial Accounting Standards Board had formulated a standard for “expensing” stock options, or recogniz-
ing their cost on the income statement, by the time the votes analyzed in this report were cast, shareholders nonetheless
pressed this is.
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APPENDIX A – Comparative Voting Categories 
and Fund Voting Results
Management’s Recommendations
The following chart and table compare how often fund families voted according to man-
agement’s recommendations. On the proxy, management provides its recommendation on how
shareholders should vote on the agenda items. Invariably, management recommends “for” man-
agement-sponsored proposals and “against” shareholder-sponsored proposals. 
The greater percentage of votes against management recommendations and proposals
are evidence of a more rigorous review of compensation matters.
Accordingly, we view an “against” management’s recommendations on compensation
items as being in the best interests of shareholders. Measured by support, we consider a lower
level of support for management’s recommendations in the shareholders’ best interests.
Fund average vote for management’s recommendations: 73.9%
Management's Recommendations
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Pay Constraining Average More Pro Pay Pay Enablers
Federated – 45.6% Fidelity – 72.5% American Funds – 76.8% T. Rowe Price – 83.6%
American Century –
55.9%
Janus – 75.1% Franklin – 76.9% Alliance – 85.0%
Vanguard – 65.1% Merrill Lynch – 75.3% Smith Barney – 81.81% Dreyfus – 87.3%
Putnam – 67.1% Legg Mason – 76.3% Oppenheimer – 81.83% AIM – 88.8%
TIAA-CREF – 71.0% Morgan Stanley – 91.7%
Management’s Proposals
The following chart and table compares how fund families voted on management-spon-
sored compensation proposals. This report considers a vote “against” management proposals to
be more likely to serve shareholder interests. Measured by proposal support, we consider a
lower level of support for management proposals in the shareholders’ best interests.
The average vote for management’s proposals: 75.6%
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Federated – 37.6% TIAA-CREF – 74.1% Franklin – 80.8% AIM – 90.1%
American Century – 57.5% Merrill Lynch – 76.3% American Funds – 86.5% Alliance – 90.2%
Putnam – 59.3% Legg Mason – 78.7% Janus – 86.8% Smith Barney – 91.1%
Vanguard – 64.6% Oppenheimer – 87.4% Dreyfus – 92.3%
Fidelity – 66.5% T. Rowe Price – 87.6% Morgan Stanley – 94.7%
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Shareholder Proposals 
The following chart and table compare how fund families voted on shareholder-spon-
sored compensation proposals, which included CEO compensation, commonsense pay, compen-
sation disclosure, option expensing, limit compensation, link pay to social and environmental
criteria, pay disparity, performance-based equity compensation, severance agreements and
shareholder vote on executive compensation. This report considers a vote “for” shareholder
proposals to be more likely to serve shareholder interests. 
The average votes for shareholder proposals: 27.6%
Shareholder Proposals
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Pay Constraining More Likely to Support More Pro Pay Pay Enablers
TIAA-CREF – 53.4% Legg Mason – 31.7% Alliance – 25.8% Federated – 17.4%
Janus – 44.0% Smith Barney – 31.0% American Funds – 25.4% Morgan Stanley – 15.2%
American Century – 43.1% T. Rowe Price – 28.1% Vanguard – 23.4% AIM – 10.3%
Franklin – 35.3% Merrill Lynch – 27.8% Dreyfus – 23.3% Putnam – 2.6%
Oppenheimer – 19.8% Fidelity – 2.2%
Stock Options Expensing Proposals
The following chart and table compare how fund families voted on stock option expens-
ing proposals. This report considers a vote “for” expensing proposals as serving shareholder
interests. 
Fund average support for stock option expensing proposals: 74.8%
13
Pay Constraining More Likely to Support More Pro Pay Pay Enablers
American Funds – 100% Morgan Stanley – 99.3% Smith Barney – 82.6% Federated – 41.0%
American Century – 100% Alliance – 96.4% Franklin – 67.4% T. Rowe Price – 23.1%
Dreyfus – 100% Legg Mason – 87.5% Oppenheimer – 57.1% AIM – 15.7%
TIAA-CREF – 100% Janus – 86.5% Putnam – 6.1%
Vanguard – 100% Merrill Lynch – 83.3% Fidelity – 5.3%
14
Performance-Based Stock Options
The following chart and table compare how fund families voted on proposals urging
companies to use performance-based stock options. These proposals seek to tie pay more close-
ly to an individual company, rather than stock market or industry performance. This report
considers a vote “for” performance-based option proposals to serve shareholder interests. 
Fund average support for performance-based stock options: 37.6% 
Pay Constraining Average More Pro Pay Pay Enablers
TIAA-CREF – 91.3% Smith Barney – 39.7% AIM – 17.1% American Funds – 0%
Am. Century – 86.0% T. Rowe Price – 35.0% Merrill Lynch – 11.4% Federated – 0%
Franklin – 67.6% Oppenheimer – 34.6% Alliance – 9.0% Fidelity – 0%
Janus – 60.7% Legg Mason – 33.3% Morgan Stanley – 8.0% Putnam – 0%
Dreyfus – 2.6% Vanguard – 0%
Performance-Based Stock Options
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Capping Severance
The following chart and table compare how fund families voted on proposals to cap sev-
erance or change in-control payouts to executives (golden parachutes). This report considers a
vote “for” severance proposals to serve shareholder interests. 
Fund average support capping severance: 62.2%
Pay Constraining More Likely to Support Average Pay Enablers
Dreyfus – 100% Federated – 89.7% American Century – 72.9% AIM – 17.5%
TIAA-CREF – 100% Smith Barney – 83.3% Franklin – 69.2% Oppenheimer – 16.0%
Vanguard – 95.2% American Funds – 81.3% Morgan Stanley – 9.9%
Alliance – 93.9% Legg Mason – 80.0% Merrill Lynch – 8.3%
Janus – 93.2% Fidelity – 3.0%
T. Rowe Price – 92.3% Putnam 0%
Capping Severance
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APPENDIX B: Mutual Fund Family Analysis
In this appendix, each mutual fund family is evaluated for its votes in the following six
categories: management proposals, shareholder proposals, management’s recommendations,
option expensing, performance-based options and severance. Each category lists the number of
total votes by the fund family, followed by votes for, votes against, abstentions and “no” votes.
In addition, we compared votes on management proposals at companies whose compensation
practices are “A” rated and “F” rated by The Corporate Library to see the degree to which
funds take into account company-specific practices when making voting decisions. 
The discussion of each fund preceding the categories provides a general explanation of
the fund’s voting patterns and overall tendencies on compensation-related items in comparison
with the other funds.
Category Rankings: For each voting category analyzed, the fund families have been
assigned a ranking in comparison to the other funds surveyed. The rankings range from one to
18, with “one” being the top-ranked fund family in that particular category. Five funds tied for
first on expensing options; performance-based options rankings end at 14, as five funds tied
for last.
17
AIM Investments Composite Rank: 17
AIM Funds are the second greatest Pay Enabler of the funds studied. They ranked among
the bottom dwellers for each of the voting metrics reviewed. AIM Funds were fifth least likely to
vote against management proposals, third least likely to vote for shareholder proposals and second
least likely to vote counter to management’s recommendations.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 88.8% 8.6% 2.6% 17
Management Proposals 90.1% 7.9% 2.0% 14
Shareholder Proposals 10.3% 85.7% 4.0% 16
Option Expensing 15.7% 84.3% 16
Performance-Based Options 17.1% 82.1% 0.8% 9
Severance 17.5% 82.5% 13
Management Proposals at A-rated 86.9% 13.1%
Management Proposals at F-rated 96.1% 3.9%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: AIM voted for proposals at F-rated 
companies at a higher rate than at A-rated.
AIM Compensation Voting
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t's
R
e
co
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n
s
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
Sh
a
re
ho
ld
e
r
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
O
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
n
si
n
g
Pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
-
Ba
se
d
Eq
u
ity
Se
ve
ra
n
ce
Su
pp
o
rt
AllianceBernstein Composite Rank: 15
The Alliance Fund Family ranked number 15, making it the fourth top Pay Enabler in
the group studied. Alliance Funds were fourth least likely to vote against management propos-
als, fell in the middle of funds voting for shareholder proposals, and were fourth least likely to
vote counter to management’s vote recommendations.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Rank
Management’s Recommendations 85.0% 14.2% 0.8% 15
Management Proposals 90.2% 8.9% 0.9% 15
Shareholder Proposals 25.8% 73.7% 0.4% 9
Option Expensing 96.4% 3.6% 7
Performance-Based Options 9.0% 91.0% 11
Severance 93.9% 6.1% 4
Management Proposals at A-rated 80.4% 19.6%
Management Proposals at F-rated 95.5% 4.5%
.Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: The Alliance fund family voted for manage-
ment proposals more at F-rated companies than at A-rated companies.
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AIM Compensation Voting
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American Funds Composite Rank: 11
American Funds are ranked as the 11th most likely to vote on pay constraints and are in
the Pay Enabling tier. American Funds were more likely to support management proposals,
more likely to oppose shareholder proposals and were more likely to vote according to manage-
ment’s vote recommendations. For shareholder proposals, American policy supported all option
expensing and opposed all performance-based measure proposals. 
Voting Category For Against Abstain CategoryRank
Management’s Recommendations 76.8% 15.1% 8.1% 10
Management Proposals 86.5% 10.7% 2.8% 10
Shareholder Proposals 25.4% 74.6% 10
Option Expensing 100% 1 (tied)
Performance-Based Options 100% 14 (tied)
Severance 81.2% 18.8% 9
Management Proposals at A-rated 77.8% 22.2%
Management Proposals at F-rated 98.0% 2.0%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: The American Funds voted for management
proposals more at F-rated companies than at A-rated companies.
American Funds Compensation Voting
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20
American Century
Investment Management
American Century ranked as the top Pay Constrainer in our analysis, making them the
fund family most likely to vote to constrain excessive pay voting. American Century Funds were
second most likely to vote against management proposals, third most likely to vote for share-
holder proposals and were second most likely to vote counter to management’s recommenda-
tions.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 55.9% 38.6% 5.6% 2
Management Proposals 57.5% 36.7% 5.8% 2
Shareholder Proposals 43.1% 51.9% 5.0% 3
Option Expensing 100% 1 (tied)
Performance-Based Options 86.0% 7.8% 6.2% 2
Severance 72.9% 18.6% 8.6% 2
Management Proposals at A-rated 66.7% 30.5% 2.8%
Management Proposals at F-rated 57.9% 41.2% 0.9%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: American Century voted for management proposals
more at A-rated companies than at F-rated companies.
American Century Compensation Voting
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Composite Rank: 1
Dreyfus Corporation           Composite Rank: 16
Dreyfus ranked number 16, making it the third greatest Pay Enabler. Dreyfus Funds
were second most likely to support management proposals, 12th-most likely to vote for share-
holder proposals and third most likely to vote according to management’s vote recommenda-
tions. Also, Dreyfus’ voting policy supports shareholder severance proposals, in addition to pro-
posals to expense stock options.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 87.3% 12.4% 0.2% 16
Management Proposals 92.3% 7.6% 0.1% 17
Shareholder Proposals 23.3% 76.4% 0.3% 12
Option Expensing 100% 1 (tied)
Performance-Based Options 2.6% 97.4% 13
Severance 100% 1 (tied)
Management Proposals at A-rated 88.1% 11.9%
Management Proposals at F-rated 96.6% 3.4%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Dreyfus Funds voted for management proposals more
at F-rated companies than at A-rated companies.
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Dreyfus Compensation Voting
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Federated Investors Composite Rank: 3
Federated ranked as the number three Pay Constrainer because of the scrutiny it gives to
management proposals, voting against management proposals 61.2% of the time. Federated
Funds ranked number one in opposing management proposals, and in voting against manage-
ment recommendations. However, Federated fell into the Pay Enabling tier on support for
shareholder proposals voting, ranking number 14.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Rank
Management’s Recommendations 45.6% 53.4% 1.0% 1
Management Proposals 37.6% 61.2% 1.3% 1
Shareholder Proposals 17.4% 82.6% 14
Option Expensing 41.0% 59.0% 14
Performance-Based Options 100% 14 (tied)
Severance 89.7% 10.3% 7
Management Proposals at A-rated 26.9% 71.9% 1.2%
Management Proposals at F-rated 43.1% 56.9%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Federated voted for management proposals more at
F-rated companies than at A-rated companies.
Federated Compensation Voting
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t's
R
e
co
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n
s
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
Sh
a
re
ho
ld
e
r
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
O
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
n
si
n
g
Pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
-
Ba
se
d
Eq
u
ity
Se
ve
ra
n
ce
Su
pp
o
rt
Fidelity Investments           Composite Rank: 10
Fidelity ranked 10 overall in their composite voting record on pay issues. However,
Fidelity stands out as the mutual fund family most hostile to shareholder proposals, voting
against their pay proposals nearly 98% of the time, far more often than other mutual funds.
Fidelity Funds ranked fifth among the funds for voting against management compensation pro-
posals and sixth most likely to vote counter to management’s vote recommendations. 
Voting Category For Against Abstain CategoryRank
Management’s Recommendations 72.5% 25% 2.5% 6
Management Proposals 66.5% 32.1% 1.4% 5
Shareholder Proposals 2.2% 97.8% 18
Option Expensing 5.3% 94.7% 18
Performance-Based Options 100% 14 (tied)
Severance 3.0% 97.0% 17
Management Proposals at A-rated 81.2% 18.8%
Management Proposals at F-rated 61.5% 38.5%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Fidelity voted for management proposals less at
F-rated companies than at A-rated companies.
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Fidelity Compensation Voting
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t's
R
e
co
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n
s
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
Sh
a
re
ho
ld
e
r
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
O
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
n
si
n
g
Pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
-
Ba
se
d
Eq
u
ity
Se
ve
ra
n
ce
Su
pp
o
rt
Franklin Templeton Composite Rank: 8
Franklin Templeton is ranked number eight (tied with Putnam). Franklin Funds were
average in their support of management proposals, and more Pay Constraining for shareholder
proposals. Franklin Funds ranked ninth in voting against management proposals and ranked
11th in voting counter to management’s vote recommendations. Franklin Funds were fourth
most likely to support shareholder proposals overall and the third most likely to support per-
formance-based shareholder proposals.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 76.9% 20.2% 2.9% 11
Management Proposals 80.8% 15.9% 3.3% 9
Shareholder Proposals 35.3% 63.5% 1.2% 4
Option Expensing 67.4% 32.6% 12
Performance-Based Options 67.6% 32.4% 3
Severance 69.2% 20.5% 10.3% 12
Management Proposals at A-rated 68.5% 31.5%
Management Proposals at F-rated 96.1% 3.9%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Franklin Templeton voted for management proposals
more at F-rated companies than at A-rated companies.
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Franklin Compensation Voting
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t's
R
e
co
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n
s
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
Sh
a
re
ho
ld
e
r
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
O
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
n
si
n
g
Pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
-
Ba
se
d
Eq
u
ity
Se
ve
ra
n
ce
Su
pp
o
rt
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 75.1% 18.8% 6.1% 7
Management Proposals 86.8% 9.0% 4.2% 11
Shareholder Proposals 44.0% 45.2% 10.8% 2
Option Expensing 86.5% 13.5% 9
Performance-Based Options 60.7% 32.4% 6.9% 4
Severance 93.2% 6.8% 5
Management Proposals at A-rated 84.7% 12.4% 2.9%
Management Proposals at F-rated 90.4% 9.6%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Janus voted for management proposals more at F-rated
companies than at A-rated companies.
Janus Compensation Voting
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t's
R
e
co
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n
s
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
Sh
a
re
ho
ld
e
r
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
O
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
n
si
n
g
Pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
-
Ba
se
d
Eq
u
ity
Se
ve
ra
n
ce
Su
pp
o
rt
25
Janus Capital Group             Composite Rank: 5
Janus ranked number five overall with below average support for management proposals and
strong support for shareholder proposals. Janus Funds were 11th most likely to vote for man-
agement proposals and second most likely to support shareholder proposals. 
Legg Mason Composite Rank: 6
Legg Mason ranks sixth overall. Legg Mason Funds ranked eighth in voting against manage-
ment compensation proposals, fifth for supporting shareholder proposals and ninth for voting
counter to management’s vote recommendations.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 76.3% 23.7% 9
Management Proposals 78.7% 21.3% 8
Shareholder Proposals 31.7% 68.3% 5
Option Expensing 87.5% 12.5% 8
Performance-Based Options 33.3% 66.7% 8
Severance 80.0% 20.0% 10
Management Proposals at A-rated 84.6% 15.4%
Management Proposals at F-rated 80.8% 19.2%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Legg Mason voted for management proposals
more at A-rated companies than at F-rated companies.
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Legg Mason Compensation Voting
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Merrill Lynch
Investment Managers
Merrill Lynch ranks seventh in its overall voting. Merrill Lynch funds ranked seventh for voting
against management proposals, eighth for supporting shareholder proposals and eighth for vot-
ing counter to management’s vote recommendations.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 75.3% 18.0% 6.6% 8
Management Proposals 76.3% 15.2% 8.6% 7
Shareholder Proposals 27.8% 72.7% 8
Option Expensing 83.3% 16.7% 10
Performance-Based Options 11.4% 88.6% 10
Severance 8.3% 91.7% 16
Management Proposals at A-rated 93.6% 6.4%
Management Proposals at F-rated 75.0% 15.9% 9.1%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Merrill Lynch voted for management proposals
more at A-rated companies than at F-rated companies.
27
Merrill Lynch Compensation Voting
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Composite Rank: 7
28
Morgan Stanley Funds        Composite Rank: 18
Morgan Stanley is last in the rankings making it the fund family that is the greatest Pay
Enabler. Morgan Stanley was most likely to support management proposals, voting in support
nearly 95% of the time. In addition, Morgan was most likely to vote according to management’s
vote recommendations. They were fourth least likely to support shareholder proposals. Morgan
Stanley Funds supported the expensing options more than average, but were below average in
support for performance-based options and were in the bottom tier for support of shareholder
severance proposals. 
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 91.7% 8.1% 0.2% 18
Management Proposals 94.7% 5.2% 0.1% 18
Shareholder Proposals 15.2% 84.3% 0.5% 15
Option Expensing 99.3% 0.7% 6
Performance-Based Options 8.0% 92.0% 12
Severance 9.9% 90.1% 15
Management Proposals at A-rated 84.3% 15.7% 11
Management Proposals at F-rated 94.7% 5.3% 13
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Morgan Stanley voted for management proposals
more at F-rated companies than at A-rated companies.
Morgan Stanley Compensation Voting
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OppenheimerFunds Composite Rank: 14
OppenheimerFunds ranked 14th, making them a Pay Enabler. They ranked 12th in opposing
management proposals, 13th for supporting shareholder proposals, and 13th for voting counter
to management’s recommendations.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 81.8% 13.9% 4.3% 13
Management Proposals 87.4% 11.8% 0.9% 12
Shareholder Proposals 19.8% 66.5% 13.7% 13
Option Expensing 57.1% 23.8% 19.0% 13
Performance-Based Options 34.6% 34.6% 30.8% 7
Severance 16.0% 84.0% 14
Management Proposals at A-rated 90.4% 9.6%
Management Proposals at F-rated 89.1% 10.9%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: OppenheimerFunds voted for management proposals
at F-and A-rated companies with equal frequency.
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Oppenheimer Compensation Voting
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Putnam Investments            Composite Rank: 8
Putnam ranked eighth (tied with Franklin Templeton). Putnam ranked third for being most
likely to vote against management proposals and ranked fourth for being most likely to vote
counter to management’s vote recommendations, but ranked second-to-last for supporting
shareholder proposals. Putnam ranked second-to-last for voting against stock option expensing,
last for severance and tied for last for performance-based options.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 67.1% 30.5% 2.4% 4
Management Proposals 59.3% 37.2% 3.5% 3
Shareholder Proposals 2.6% 97.4% 17
Option Expensing 6.1% 93.9% 17
Performance-Based Options 100% 14 (tied)
Severance 100% 18
Management Proposals at A-rated 77.0% 23.0%
Management Proposals at F-rated 65.6% 34.4%
30
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Putnam voted for management proposals more at
A-rated companies than at F-rated companies.
Putnam Compensation Voting
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Smith Barney
Asset Management (Citigroup)
Smith Barney ranked number 12 (tied with T. Rowe Price). Smith Barney Funds ranked 16th in
voting against management proposals but ranked sixth for supporting shareholder proposals.
Smith Barney Funds ranked 12th for voting counter to management’s vote recommendations.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 81.8% 15.3% 2.9% 12
Management Proposals 91.1% 6.0% 2.9% 16
Shareholder Proposals 31.0% 66.1% 2.9% 6
Option Expensing 82.6% 11.6% 5.8% 11
Performance-Based Options 39.7% 56.2% 4.1% 5
Severance 83.3% 16.7% 8
Management Proposals at A-rated 97.3% 2.7%
Management Proposals at F-rated 84.5% 15.5%
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Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Smith Barney voted for management proposals more
at A-rated companies than at F-rated companies.
Smith Barney Compensation Voting
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Composite Rank: 12
T. Rowe Price Group          Composite Rank: 12
T. Rowe Price is ranked number 12 (tied with Smith Barney). T. Rowe Price Funds ranked 13th
for voting against management proposals, ranked seventh for supporting shareholder proposals
and ranked 14th for voting counter to management’s vote recommendations. T. Rowe Price
funds voted against option expensing nearly 70 percent of the time.
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 83.6% 16.0% 0.5% 14
Management Proposals 87.6% 12.4% 13
Shareholder Proposals 28.1% 69.8% 2.2% 7
Option Expensing 23.1% 69.2% 7.7% 15
Performance-Based Options 35.0% 65.0% 6
Severance 92.3% 7.7% 6
Management Proposals at A-rated 80.7% 19.3%
Management Proposals at F-rated 85.7% 14.3%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: T. Rowe Price voted for management proposals more at
F-rated companies than at A-rated companies.
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T. Rowe Price Compensation Voting
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t's
R
e
co
m
m
e
n
da
tio
n
s
M
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
Sh
a
re
ho
ld
e
r
Pr
o
po
sa
ls
O
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
n
si
n
g
Pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
-
Ba
se
d
Eq
u
ity
Se
ve
ra
n
ce
Su
pp
o
rt
Voting Category For Against Abstain Category Rank
Management’s Recommendations 71.0% 28.6% 0.3% 5
Management Proposals 74.1% 25.6% 0.3% 6
Shareholder Proposals 53.4% 45.5% 1.1% 1
Option Expensing 100% 1 (tied)
Performance-Based Options 91.3% 4.0% 4.8% 1
Severance 100% 1 (tied)
Management Proposals at A-rated 77.6% 22.4%
Management Proposals at F-rated 79.3% 20.7%
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: TIAA-CREF voted for management proposals at F-and
A-rated companies with substantially the same frequency.
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TIAA CREF Compensation Voting
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TIAA-CREF
Asset Management
TIAA-CREF ranked as the second-best Pay Constrainer on compensation issues, making it one
of the few mutual funds families that aggressively vote onpay proposals. TIAA-CREF Funds
were sixth most likely to vote against management proposals, ranked first for supporting share-
holder proposals, and ranked fifth for voting counter to management’s vote recommendations.
TIAA-CREF ranked first for supporting expensing options, performance-based equity and sev-
erance agreement proposals. 
Composite Rank: 2
Vanguard Group                Composite Rank: 4
Vanguard ranked fourth overall, making it a Pay Constrainer. Vanguard Funds ranked third for
voting against management proposals. However, they were below average for supporting share-
holder proposals, ranking 11th. Vanguard opposed all performance-based shareholder proposals.
Voting Category For Against Abstain CategoryRank
Management’s Recommendations 65.1% 34.4% 0.5% 3
Management Proposals 64.6% 35.4% 4
Shareholder Proposals 23.4% 70.8% 5.8% 11
Option Expensing 100% 1(T)
Performance-Based Options 100% 14(T)
Severance 95.2% 4.8% 3
Management Proposals at A-rated 69.8% 30.2%
Management Proposals at F-rated 80.7% 19.3%
34
Management proposals at A- and F-rated companies: Vanguard voted for management proposals more at
F-rated companies than at A-rated companies.
Vanguard Compensation Voting
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